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1 Introduction
China’s explosion onto the world trade and trade
policy scene is the product of its size, recent dynamic
growth and entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The first two factors determine the volume
of goods and services being produced and consumed
by China, while the third restricts (but does not
eliminate) the arbitrary controls that its trade
partners can impose in the cause of “orderly trade”.
But for economically small countries, like most
in Africa and many in Latin America, it is difficult
to pinpoint exactly where the effects will be greatest,
except in the case of clothing and textiles (where
the explosion has coincided with the removal of
decades-old restrictions that had shaped the global
pattern of trade; see the contributions by Morris
and McCormick et al. in this IDS Bulletin). This is
because “the China effect” is widespread and non-
marginal. The first of these means that most countries
will be affected on several fronts, both directly and
via substitute/ complementary products, and that
these effects may be reinforcing or offsetting. The
second means that the impact will be felt on world
market prices and not be limited to countries that
trade directly with China. Neither of the most
conventional focusing mechanisms is appropriate
to this combination.
This article does not attempt to answer a question
such as ‘how will Ghana’s economy be affected by
China?’, but it does take the first step in providing
an answer and a methodology for identifying where
the second step should be taken (which includes
assessing whether Ghana or Ethiopia are higher
priorities for further research).
In so doing, it also brings to centre stage, one of
the enduring controversies over trade policy: is an
increase in imports to be welcomed as enhancing
consumer welfare or deplored as hurting domestic
production? This is because for most poor countries,
the current furore over clothing notwithstanding,
the biggest China effect will be on their imports,
not their exports. And because of this, sub-Saharan
Africa is likely to be affected as much as other
developing country regions.
2 The methodological quagmire
The broad ways in which China will affect other
countries are easy to spot. Countries producing goods
highly demanded by China (e.g. some minerals) may
see export growth; those exporting products in
competition with its output (such as clothing) will
see exports fall, while countries importing those
goods will gain from lower prices. If the importers
also have domestic industries that are in competition
in the local market with Chinese exports, there will
be distributional effects (between producers and
consumers) and possible knock-on effects on the
feasibility of the country’s industrial policy.
This leads to the rather general conclusion,
without the need for any more research, that the
outlook for primary commodity exports is brighter
than it has been in the past, while that for
manufactured exports is much darker. Given the
importance of manufactured exports in the
successful growth over recent decades of East and
South-East Asia, this finding alone should provoke
a re-think of development strategies in, for example,
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Kaplinsky 2005). But
this thought introduces the first of the
methodological problems of going beyond such
generalities while remaining at a global (or regional)
level of analysis.
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3 The counterfactual
The impact on a given country of lower world prices
for manufactures will depend on whether it is
currently an exporter of the goods in question or,
if not, whether it could reasonably have expected
to become an exporter in the medium term. On the
traditional view that sees the development of a
strong industrial base as a “normal” stage in
development, the answer would tend to be
affirmative. But the traditional view has been under
pressure for some years. Recent evidence illustrates
how some manufactures (e.g. plain cotton T-shirts)
exhibit the characteristics of bulk commodities,
while some primaries (e.g. roses or strawberries)
have market features akin to those associated with
manufactures. Moreover, value-chain analysis shows
a multi-level global pattern of producing
“manufactures”; different elements of the “China
effect” may impact differentially on these levels and
so produce unexpected effects. Take, for example
the apparently clear-cut case of China’s impact on
world textile and clothing markets. China’s exports
are expected to reduce the price of both: but the
relative effects may be as important for some
developing countries as the absolute effect. If the
price of textiles falls more it might allow developing
countries without a fabric industry to compete in
the garment sector by reducing the price of their
raw materials.
Even before going beyond the broadest of
generalisations, therefore, it is immediately apparent
that answering the question about the impact of
China on Ghana involves further research both in
Ghana and on the dynamics of the value chains
with which Ghana is, or might be, involved. And
here we encounter a further methodological
problem which is the opposite of one of those
affecting China. China is so big, its effects are non-
marginal and (almost) across-the-board. Ghana is
so small that it is completely marginal and any
attempt to forecast what might have been in relation
to potential future trade is inherently speculative.
To continue with the example of clothing it has
been recognised for the past decade that the
“window of opportunity” for SSA to establish itself
was a narrow one, which was likely to close around
2005 with the end of the Multifibre Arrangement
(MFA). For established exporters, like Mauritius,
life after the MFA was expected to be tough but,
probably, survivable for the upper end of the sector;
for recent arrivals like Lesotho it was expected to
be very tough and, quite probably, terminal. And
for those like Ghana that had not entered the market
it was expected to foreclose options at least in the
medium term.
China has made the transition much more brutal
than anticipated, but has it altered the medium-
term effects? If the Mauritius clothing industry
disappears entirely it might be reasonable to attribute
that to China, but what if the same occurs in Lesotho,
Namibia or, even, South Africa? Reasonable people
can differ; some may claim it is a China effect, others
that extinction was inevitable (especially in these
three cases because of the general equilibrium effects
on a manufacturing sector undermined by booming
services and primaries trade).
4 Identifying priorities
This is a recipe for unending, circular debate. Those
wishing to see China as a “problem” and SSA as a
“victim” can point to the fall in world prices of
manufactures as the vehicle for these malign effects.
Others can argue that the world price fall is a gain
for SSA not only in relation to its terms of trade but
also for demonstrating as futile, wasteful and costly
policies to protect no-hope infant industries. Not
only will the evidence required to resolve the issue
be speculative (and hence open to question) but it
will be required across-the-board in relation to every
potential import and export. This presents an
impossible research task.
Focusing attention on the key products and the
“most potentially affected” countries is a necessity
if the circular debate is to be brought to any
consensus. But this presents its own methodological
challenge, since neither of the two obvious
methodologies for providing an initial trade analysis
is wholly appropriate.
Since the change is non-marginal it will affect
world markets generally. Because the impact will
not be limited to countries that trade directly with
China, the potential population of poor states to
analyse is a large one. Only relatively few small
states trade substantially with China. Jenkins and
Edwards, for example, show that of the 18
developing countries they analyse just four directed
over 5 per cent of exports to China in 2002, while
only seven (all but two Asian) sourced over 5 per
cent of their imports from China (Jenkins and
Edwards 2004: Tables 1–3, 10, 12, 14).
Where markets are global, the precise direction
of trade may be irrelevant. Only two SSA countries
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in their sample had over 1.5 per cent of their exports
directed to China. But they mainly exported
minerals into well-developed world markets. Other
SSA states export into the same markets; they are
just as likely to be affected as the two that sell direct
to China. Nigeria, for example, was not one of the
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Table 1: Trade overlap by country
Country No of cases in which China may produce:
Trade balance gain
*
Trade balance loss
†
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 0 6 6 1 0 1
Benin 0 2 2 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 1 0 1 0 0 0
Cameroon 0 1 1 0 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0
Congo Republic 0 2 2 0 0 0
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1 0 1 0 0 0
Ethiopia 1 0 1 0 1 1
Ghana 0 4 4 1 1 2
Guinea 1 1 2 0 0 0
Kenya 0 2 2 1 1 2
Madagascar 0 1 1 0 1 1
Malawi 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mali 0 1 1 0 0 0
Mauritania 1 1 2 0 0 0
Mauritius 0 2 2 0 1 1
Mozambique 0 1 1 0 1 1
Niger 1 1 2 0 0 0
Nigeria 1 6 7 2 1 3
Senegal 0 1 1 0 0 0
South Africa 3 3 6 2 2 4
Sudan 1 4 5 1 0 1
Tanzania 1 2 3 0 0 0
Togo 0 1 1 0 0 0
Uganda 0 1 1 0 0 0
Zambia 1 0 1 0 1 1
Zimbabwe 1 0 1 0 0 0
Latin America
Argentina 2 3 5 1 3 4
Bolivia 0 2 2 1 0 1
Brazil 4 0 4 2 8 10
Chile 1 5 6 2 0 2
Colombia 1 3 4 2 1 3
Ecuador 1 3 4 1 0 1
Peru 1 1 2 1 1 2
Uruguay 0 0 0 1 1 2
Venezuela 3 3 6 0 2 2
*
Trade balance gain = being an exporter of a good that China imports; being an importer of a good that
China exports (figures exclude imports of brown goods). 
†
Trade balance loss = being an importer of a good
that China imports; being an exporter of a good that China exports.
“group of two” because it sells its oil to the US,
which is where the appropriate refineries are
situated. But this does not mean that it is insulated
from the China effect compared with Cameroon
which exports oil direct to China. Nor can the
analysis be limited just to the products that are
imported/exported on to the world market by
China. There are substitutes and complementary
products that must be taken into account.
One traditional focusing mechanism is to
undertake a broad-brush (HS two-digit) trade review
to identify overlaps between the world trade of China
and that of particular developing countries.
Unfortunately, these categories often do not coincide
with actual product markets. Sometimes they are too
broad: there can be intense competition in one sub-
section of the 96 HS two-digit chapters which is
masked by the “noise” from the remainder of the
category. Sometimes they are too narrow: markets
involve products that are classified under different
headings.
This problem can be overcome when dealing
with small developing countries by going to the
other end of the spectrum and undertaking the
analysis at a high level of disaggregation. The 5705
HS six-digit categories allow a much more precise
link to be made between trade flow data and actual
product markets. Even here, though, there are
problems. The clothing firm Shibani in Mauritius
is in effect producing a different type of product to
that of a factory just down the road. The first
produces luxury garments using very high-tech
equipment and expensive materials, while the latter
is more run of the mill. But their outputs are
classified under the same six-digit heading.
When China is in the spotlight though, such
problems become completely insurmountable. Such
is the breadth of its exports and imports that it
becomes a mammoth task to try to cover at a high
level of disaggregation even the most important.
Consequently, any attempt to answer the
question ‘what impact will China have on Ghana?’
risks falling into one of two pits. If it goes for a
highly aggregated analysis the results may well go
little beyond putting a few numbers on the
conventional wisdom that prices for primaries will
rise and those for manufactures fall. If, by contrast,
the analysis plunges into the details of traded goods,
it will take a substantial input of resources to
complete the job. And then, having spent significant
time and money, the conclusions are likely to be
… rather similar to those from the aggregate
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Figure 1: Chinese imports of particular significance to Latin America/SSA
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analysis. This is because, in truth, there is so much
uncertainty about the way in which product markets
will evolve that the impact on small participants
such as Ghana must remain a matter of speculation.
5 A fresh approach
This article suggests a better way into the problem
of assessing the product and country consequences
of China’s growing presence in global markets. The
ultimate goal is to be able to identify more clearly
than we can at the present time, which sectors in
which countries deserve the highest priority for the
more detailed (and therefore resource-intensive)
research that will be needed to advise policy-makers
on how they should respond to the changing world.
6 The methodology
The key to the approach is the selection of groups
of HS6 sub-heads that fulfil two criteria: China’s
export or import growth has been particularly rapid,
and they are important products for developing
countries. By taking account only of those HS6 sub-
heads for which trade growth has been strong and
which are relevant to developing countries, the
problem of too much “noise” inherent in the
aggregate trade analysis is diminished. But by re-
aggregating these items into specially created
product groups, the exercise avoids simply creating
a morass of indigestible information.
The thresholds established for each of these
criteria in the article are arbitrary and need to be
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Figure 2: Chinese exports of particular significance to Latin America/SSA
Product groups
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varied to see how the results change. But preliminary
though they are, they suggest that the China effect
may be felt in areas that have previously been
overlooked. The starting point for focusing attention
on key Chinese imports were the 397 HS6 products
valued at US$25m or more that had grown 50 per
cent faster than the average (in most cases over the
five-year period ending in 2003, the latest for which
data are available).
1
These were grouped into 37
broad product groups, using the researchers’
judgement, and were whittled down to the seven
listed in Figure 1. These are the groups in which
China’s imports represented a high proportion of
the world total, and trade was significant for
SSA/Latin America (either imports, or exports or
both). A similar process applied to China’s exports
established 17 broad product groups
2
which were
also whittled down, to eight (listed in Figure 2).
Once identified in this way, the product groups
were subject to a detailed analysis to determine
SSA/Latin America import trends.
3
7 The results
Figures 1 and 2 summarise, respectively for China’s
imports and its exports, the broad picture of the
products and developing countries that are of
particular interest. Table 1 summarises this
information by country, splitting the effects into
those likely to favour a country’s trade balance
(increased demand for their exports or lower prices
for their imports) and those likely to disfavour it
(increased export competition in third markets, or
increased world demand for goods that are
imported). While this neatly sidesteps the tricky
problem noted above, of whether more, cheaper
imports is an economic as well as a trade balance
gain (since it cannot sensibly be handled at this level
of analysis), the information in the Figures show for
each of the countries listed, the product groups for
which such strategic analysis would be desirable.
Table 1 provides a framework for assessing the
trade impact of China on SSA/Latin American
economies. If a country exports a product which
China imports or imports a product which China
exports (columns 1 and 2 in Table 1), it is seen as
being a beneficiary of expanded trade flows. On
the contrary, if it exports products which China
exports or imports products which China imports
(columns 4 and 5 in the Table), it is likely to be a
loser. Column 3 adds up the number of sectors
where there are gains, and column 6 the number
of sectors where there are losses.
Some findings are as one might expect. Brazil
faces the widest range of trade-loss products: ten
in total. South Africa is well represented in both
columns but stands to gain in more product groups
than it loses. But there are some results that are not
intuitively obvious. Angola, Ghana, Nigeria and
Sudan also have a high “gain” incidence. Only two
SSA and two Latin American countries have a larger
number of product groups in which they may
potentially lose than those in which they may gain.
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Figure 3: Gains by type and country
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Figure 4: Losses by type and country
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8 Types of trade effect
8.1 Country-specific impacts
Figure 3 assesses the impact of these trade flows
on individual economies. It takes all countries with
a score of two or more in either of the “gain” columns
of Table 1 and plots them in a simple four-cell matrix
to indicate whether the gains arise primarily from
lower import costs, from greater export revenue,
or from both.
Unsurprisingly, all of the SSA states apart from
South Africa are in the bottom right cell, indicating
that their trade balance gains arise primarily from
lower import costs – but so, too, are four of the
seven Latin American states. Although there has
not yet been any absolute or relative quantification
in this article of the scale of these effects, this simple
sorting reinforces the expectation that many more
countries will be affected by China on the import
than on the export front.
Figure 4 performs the same exercise for the two
types of trade balance loss: greater competition on
world markets with China’s exports, and potentially
higher prices for imports that are being sucked into
China. The key feature of Figure 4 is the absence
of any SSA states other than Nigeria and South
Africa. This will partly be a reflection of small
country size, but not entirely since the same broad
value thresholds were used when classifying
countries in relation to trade balance gains. It is
likely also to be a function of the commodity
composition of trade. China’s imports are those
associated with a rapidly industrialising state; since
few SSA states fall into this category they are not
competing for world supplies of the same products.
China’s exports are of manufactures. About the only
manufacture of SSA that is significant across several
countries is clothing. As Figure 4 covers only
countries with two or more loss products, those
states for which clothing is the only substantial
manufactured export are overlooked (but see
Morris, and McCormick et al. in this IDS Bulletin).
8.2 Product-specific effects
This methodology may also be used to allow a
deeper exploration of trade effects through a product
and value chains focus. To illustrate this potential,
we briefly focus on two product groupings: feeds,
which are both important in the SSA/Latin American
context and involve complex substitution effects;
and metals, where the impacts are simpler. How
directly related are Chinese and SSA/Latin American
products? How substantial is each country’s trade?
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Table 2: Feed trade
Total feed Of which soya beans
Value 2003 Average annual Share of 2003 Average annual 
(US$’000) change value (%) change in value 
1999–2003 (%) 1999–2003 (%)
China imports 5,785,368 57 94 57
Exports by:
Argentina 2,115,067 42 100 42
Brazil 4,942,242 31 100 31
Burkina Faso 11,526 7 – –
Ecuador 16,096 20 90 27
Ethiopia 48,640 27 – –
Nigeria 21,536 –4 0.03 7
Sudan 81,729 –3 – –
Tanzania 13,923 3 – –
Imports by:
Bolivia 43,120 18 100 18
Colombia 56,363 40 98 41
Uruguay 111,297 30 99 30
Source: Derived from data obtained from UNSD Comtrade database.
8.3 Feed
A particularly intriguing “focus product” is animal
feed: it is not something that has been widely picked
up and it is of potential interest to a different range
of developing countries from those for which the
more widely reported mineral imports of China
would be relevant. The middle pane of Table 2
shows that the exports of feed by SSA states, while
tiny in comparison with those of Argentina and
Brazil, are not insignificant. An export of US$49m
for Ethiopia, which has increased by 27 per cent a
year since 1999, is not trivial.
The “problem” is that the feeds being exported
by Africa are not the same as those that form the bulk
of China’s imports and are being exported by
Argentina and Brazil. A total of 94 per cent of China’s
imports of the product group that we have dubbed
“feed” are of soya beans. Most of the Latin American
exports are also in soya beans, but almost none of
the SSA exports. For Africa the main export is
sesamum seeds. So large are China’s imports that
“only 6 per cent” of its feed imports is a sizeable
amount: the increase alone in China’s imports of
sesamum seed between 1999 and 2003 was
equivalent to over one-quarter of the total 2003
exports of the product by the five SSA states in the
table.
This is prima facie evidence to justify further
research. The next step is to investigate the feed
market to determine whether the grains being
exported from SSA are, indeed, direct inputs into
feed (or indirectly affected by feed because they are
substitutes for feed grains) and whether there are
knock-on effects from the trend in the dominant
grain. Bolivia, Colombia and Uruguay, shown in
the bottom pane of Table 2, have significant and
rapidly growing imports, primarily of soya beans.
Any pressure on world prices could adversely affect
the profitability of their meat industries.
8.4 Metals
Tables 3 and 4 provide basic data on the role played
by various metals in the exports of SSA and Latin
American economies. The main purpose of the
tables is to determine the absolute importance of
each product for the SSA/Latin American countries
that trade in them and whether or not
exports/imports are sustained (indicated by the
average annual change columns).
Exports of alumina by all three countries in
Table 3 are significant and sustained. At US$111m,
the export must be considered significant for
Guinea. The very rapid annual change in
Mozambique aluminium exports probably reflects
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Table 3: Aluminium and alumina trade
Total alumina/aluminium
Value 2003 (US$’000) Average annual change
1999–2003 (%)
Chinese alumina imports 1,375,761 42
Alumina exports by:
Brazil 301,550 12
Guinea 110,571 10
Venezuela 120,038 18
China aluminium exports 2,413,824 60
Exports by:
Argentina 153,068 24
Brazil 876,750 ?2
Cameroon 74,967 ?7
Ghana 94,867 ?5
Mozambique 564,393 1500
South Africa 652,534 ?2
Venezuela 526,504 3
Source: Derived from data obtained from UNSD Comtrade database.
the fact that production seems to have come on
stream in 2001. If it is the case that it is a relatively
new plant, the implications of the growth in China’s
exports on to the world market (up 60 per cent a
year) probably need to be taken into account when
assessing long-term viability. The same applies to
investment on stream in the other countries.
Ferrous metals, copper articles and cobalt are
covered in Table 4, which serves merely to confirm
what might be expected. With the exception of
ferrous metals (which need to be split into
component parts), the picture seems unambiguously
to suggest growing demand from China for minerals
of which the countries in the table are significant
and sustained exporters. One might query, however,
the position of copper in South Africa, given that
exports have been declining rapidly.
9 Where next?
The purpose of this initial application of a focusing
methodology is partly to see whether or not it throws
up issues that were not already on the table and
partly to point to the highest priorities for the further
research that is essential to dig beneath the headline
China effects. Although the impact of China as a
source of cheaper imports is not a new finding, the
demonstration of its ubiquity is noteworthy. Given
the ambivalence of attitudes towards cheaper
imports, there is a clear case for further research
using Figure 2 as a guide: country-level in the
identified states and by value-chain for the product
groups. For those countries not already exporting,
how likely is it that they could have entered the
pre-China value chains in a sustainable and
economically advantageous way over the medium
term? It is the answer to that question which will
determine whether or not the fall in import costs
is to be seen primarily as a term of trade gain or a
development loss.
There are distinct sectoral differences. For
example, the feed sector in Latin America and SSA
clearly deserves further attention. This is not a sector
that has been widely perceived as being affected by
China’s growth. It provides a potential opportunity
to countries that have relatively weak (and, post-
China even weaker) manufacturing sectors but are
not endowed with the right minerals. In addition
to the products covered in Tables 2–4 there are the
cases of leather, footwear, clothing and textiles to
consider (as well as the miscellaneous categories
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Table 4: Trade in ferrous metals, copper articles and cobalt
Ferrous metals Copper articles Cobalt
Value 2003 Average Value 2003 Average Value 2003 Average 
(US$’000) annual (US$’000) annual (US$’000) annual 
change change change 
1999–2003 (%) 1999–2003 (%) 1999–2003 (%)
Chinese imports 14,622,995 55 3,074,780 43 94,684 65
Exports by:
Argentina 340,680 17 – – – –
Brazil 4,035,545 11 – – – –
Chile – – 4,658,909 8 – –
Colombia 394,879 22 – – – –
Congo DR – – – – 54,340 2
Congo Rep. – – – – 22,811 204
Mauritania 24,258 74 – – – –
Peru – – 763,027 5 – –
South Africa 1,861,415 8 55,852 –22 21,683 11
Venezuela 788,255 24 – – – –
Zambia – – 240,378 –1 – –
Zimbabwe 116,685 4 – – – –
Source: Derived from data obtained from UNSD Comtrade database.
Notes
1. Comtrade offers two sources for imports from the world,
one of them derived from the importing country’s data
and the other from the data supplied on other country
exports to China. The two do not coincide. It was decided
to use the data on imports reported by China as likely to
be the more comprehensive. In the event, however, this
may have been a mistake, since when looking at other
countries’ trade, the data from the source derived from
their trade partners’ export statistics appeared more
plausible. We have ended up, therefore, using one of the
two sources for China’s imports and the other for
developing country imports.
2. Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, chemicals, plastics, leather
and articles, wood and paper, textiles, clothing, footwear,
glass, ferrous metals and products, aluminium, engines
and pumps, white goods, brown goods, cars and parts,
furniture.
3. Brown goods have been excluded from this analysis due
to their complexity and the fact that with the exception
of Brazil, all SSA/Latin American economies are net
importers and therefore would gain ambiguously in
relation to consumer welfare (subject, of course, to intra-
industry trade patterns that could only be picked up by
the more focused studies to which research such as this
is a pointer).
of white and brown goods – too complex to deal
with in this introductory article). There is much to
be done, not least because some of the existing
analyses do not go far enough. The case of clothing,
for example, has been well rehearsed, but the most
critical policy implications of a possible change in
the relative price of textiles has not necessarily been
taken on board in a debate that appears to have
progressed no further than hand-wringing over the
long-anticipated challenge facing developing
country clothing exporters. Evidently, many of these
may go to the wall; but what policy measures by
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) states would best help the
potential survivors (other than ad hoc and chaotic
quotas on Chinese garments)?
It would be particularly interesting to undertake
work on value chains and preference arrangements
to determine whether or not the case for amending
OECD rules of origin (that, in the main, prohibit
the use of non-originating cloth) has been
strengthened by the growth of Chinese exports. Far
more SSA/Latin American countries are net importers
of textiles than are exporters. Indeed, with the
exception of Zambia (cotton yarn) only Brazil is a
significant net exporter. Attention now needs to be
given to the possible competitive advantage resulting
from cheaper cloth for Latin American/SSA clothing
industries. If these industries are prevented from
using the cloth solely by onerous origin rules in their
export markets, then the case that such rules are
prejudicing development becomes even stronger.
In the cases of footwear and leather, further
analysis is required at the micro-level within the
context of value-chain research. Any negative “China
effect”, if there is one, is less likely to be on the trade
balance than on the division of labour within value
chains. Of the countries considered, Brazil is the
only significant net exporter of footwear (with
Ecuador also having very modest net exports in
2003), although these “net figures” probably mask
a certain value of exports from a much wider range
of countries (which in all except the two cited are
smaller than their imports). Although this would
not alter the conclusion that for all countries except
Brazil (and to a very minor extent Ecuador) the
trade balance effect of China in footwear is positive,
one would want to check also the effect on industrial
structure in significant producing states. SSA is a
significant exporter of leather and the effect of China
on its value chains may be important.
Finally, this article has been concerned with the
impact of China’s rapid trade growth. Due to its size
and rapidity, this has non-marginal effects on many
countries and products. But it is not just China,
since at current growth rates, India will follow the
US and China and become one of the world’s largest
economies. Its trade growth, too, is likely to have
a non-marginal impact on other countries and on
particular sectors.
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